Ojhri Camp Blast

The Story of the Ojhri Camp Tragedy

On April 10, 1988, an unimaginable catastrophe struck Rawalpindi and Islamabad. It was as if doomsday had descended on these cities, with innocent civilians running for their lives as they were targeted by missiles and bombs. But this wasn’t a foreign attack; it was the outcome of a colossal failure by those meant to protect. 

General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, celebrated as the "Victor of the Soviet Union," is lesser-known for being solely responsible for the Ojhri Camp disaster. He established a massive ammunition depot right in the heart of the city, placing the lives of thousands directly in harm’s way.

At around 10:30 in the morning, the depot, storing 10,000 tons of ammunition, erupted in an apocalyptic explosion. Missiles, rockets, and an assortment of military weaponry shot out from the depot, targeting unsuspecting civilians in the city streets. By conservative estimates, close to a hundred lives were lost, and thousands were left injured or disabled.

In classic "sweep it under the rug" fashion, no one was ever held accountable for this mass destruction. Instead, those responsible spread a web of fabricated conspiracy theories to cover up their own incompetence. The most widely accepted theory was that Pakistan had saved some of the U.S.-supplied ammunition for future use and that the explosion was a ploy to deceive the U.S. into thinking this stockpile had been depleted. Remarkably, this theory was embraced as truth, and we praised the very individuals responsible for such a grave failure.

Another theory suggested that some of the U.S.-provided Stinger missiles had been secretly or deliberately sold to Iran. The explosion was allegedly staged to cover up the missing missiles. Stinger missiles were pivotal in the Afghan war, where they changed the tide against the Soviets. Before their arrival, the Soviet military held a clear advantage over Afghan fighters, often sending helicopters to obliterate guerrilla strongholds at will. However, with the arrival of the Stinger, the Soviet forces couldn’t rely on helicopters or even fighter jets, as the Stingers had an 80% success rate in downing aircraft.

Pakistani trainers instructed Afghan fighters in the use of these missiles at the very Ojhri Camp, a fact that became known from Washington to Moscow. The Soviets were desperate to capture a Stinger, while the U.S. feared the missiles might fall into Soviet hands through Iran.

 

Regardless of the theories, building such a massive depot in the heart of a city was a reckless decision. The individuals responsible should have faced the harshest penalties, possibly even the gallows. But Pakistan's justice system often bends to power—the bigger the culprit, the higher their status.